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HARSHER DISCIPLINE FOR UNION STEWARDS THAN
RANK-AND-FILE FOR PARTICIPATION IN
ILLEGAL STRIKE ACTIVITY
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB
599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979)
In Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that discriminatory
discipline of union stewards for participating in an unlawful strike was
proper employer conduct. This decision denied enforcement of an order issued by the National Labor Relations Board which had held that
such conduct was an unfair labor practice. 2 In an era of increasing
employee unrest, 3 the Indiana decision has important implications for
management and labor alike. From a management standpoint, it may
provide an effective deterrent against unlawful strike activity. From a
labor standpoint, it may create an obstacle in finding people willing to
undertake the position of union steward. Despite the fact that this decision may have such far-reaching impact, the Seventh Circuit failed to
consider fully the legal and policy considerations underlying its conclusion. This case comment will examine those considerations and conclude that the Indiana result was a desirable one, but that the Seventh
Circuit diluted the strength of its decision by relying too heavily upon
its own incorrect view of Board policy.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act 4 provides that
it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with the
right of employees to engage in union activities. Section 8(a)(3) further
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate against employees in a manner that would either encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.5 A violation of section 8(a)(3) constitutes a derivative violation of section
I. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
2. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978).

3.
GAINING

4.

See generally B. POGREBIN, NEW TRENDS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZING AND BAR-

(1976).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) [the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169

(1976), is hereinafter referred to as the Act].
5.

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).

See note 75 infra for the text of this section.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

8(a)(1) when the employer's acts serve to discourage union membership
or activities. 6 The central purpose of these provisions is to protect employee self-organization and the process of collective bargaining from
7
disruptive interference from employers.
The National Labor Relations Board was created to implement
these provisions and to remedy any violations thereof 8 To accomplish
these objectives, the Board is authorized to promulgate rules of general
or particular applicability which also have future effect. 9 A decision of
the Board may be appealed to the circuit courts to determine whether it
was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, or as
in the instant case, whether it was a proper application of the law.' 0
Historically, the tension between the Board and the circuit courts
has been acute because the Board's power of enforcement depends
upon enforcement decrees issued by the federal circuit courts of appeals. I This tension is evident in the different interpretations the
Board and the circuits have placed upon the discrimination guidelines
established by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers,Inc. 12 In Great Dane, the employer had refused to give
accrued vacation pay to striking employees but announced its intention
to pay such benefits to strikers' replacements, returning strikers, and
employees who had not struck. The Board felt that such discriminatory
conduct was violative of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).1 3 The Fifth Circuit did not find a violation.14 The Supreme Court reversed and held
that the action was an unfair labor practice primarily grounded in section 8(a)(3), which specifically requires that in order to find a violation
the Board must find discrimination and a resulting discouragement of
6. Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 845 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974). In Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 227
n.2 (7th Cir. 1979), the court stated that the opinion of the administrative law judge in the original
hearing of the same case did not reflect a determination that there was an independent violation of
section 8(a)(l), and that the Board did not contend that the court should treat the two separately.
Therefore, the same proof was required to show a violation of either section.
7. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). See K. McGUINESS, How TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (4th ed. 1976).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976). This section defines "rule," in part, as "the whole or a part of

an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
"
interpret, or prescribe law or policy ...
10. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
956 (1977); see also NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
11. DuRoss, TowardRationalityin DiscriminatoryDischarge Cases, 66 GEO. L.J. 1109 (1978).

12. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
13. 150 N.L.R.B. 438 (1964).
14. 363 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1966).
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union membership.' 5
The Great Dane Court further held that, where unfair labor practices are at issue, the finding of a violation depends upon whether the
discriminatory conduct was motivated by anti-union animus. The
Court established a two-tier test to determine if such improper purpose
was present. The first tier of that test provided that, in situations where
the employer's conduct was inherently destructive of important rights,
no proof of anti-union animus would be required. Where the existence
of such conduct is established, the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that its conduct was actually motivated by business considerations. The second tier of that test
provided that, in situations where the adverse effect of the employer's
discriminatory conduct was relatively slight and the employer came
forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for its actions, anti-union animus must be proven before the
Board can find an unfair labor practice.' 6 The Court found that the
employer's conduct in Great Dane was inherently destructive of important employee rights and, hence, constituted an unfair labor practice.
The Inherently Destructive Test
Since the formulation of the two-pronged Great Dane test, there
has been considerable confusion in its application. In applying the first
tier of this test, the courts have found that the phrase "inherently destructive" is not easily defined, and cases finding violations under this
standard are relatively rare.' 7 It is generally acknowledged, however,
that actions creating visible and continuing obstacles to the future exercise of employee rights are inherently destructive.' 8 In addition to the
Great Dane fact situation,' 9 there are several other employer activities
which have been found to be inherently destructive. Among them are
the permanent discharge of employees for participation in protected
2
union activities; 20 the guarantee of superseniority to strikebreakers; '
the refusal to bargain with a duly-elected union, coupled with the em15. 388 U.S. at 32.
16. Id. at 33.
17. Loomis Courier Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1979).
18. Id. See also Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1976).
19. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found inherently destructive
employer action under the same factual circumstances as those in Great Dane in System Council
T-4 v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1059 (1972).
20. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
21. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).

CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW

ployer's coercive activities to prevent formation of that union;22 the employer's policy of assigning returned strikers to the least desirable shifts
on a non-rotating basis; 23 and the discharge of a large number of employees, including some union leaders, during a union organizing campaign. 24 In each of these cases, the reviewing courts found that the
employer actions in question were discriminatory on their face and that
the employer must be held to have intended the foreseeable result-the
25
discouragement of union membership.
On the other hand, there are several types of actions which have
been found not to be inherently destructive of employee rights. In Waterbury Community Antenna Inc. v. NLRB, 26 for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the discharge
of a temporary employee upon completion of the job for which he had
been hired was not inherently destructive. While on its face such a
termination might not be suspect, the employee in Waterbury had been
an active union organizer during his temporary tenure. When the
Board reviewed the case, it found that the employer's actions had discouraged other employees from joining the union, and the Board found
a violation. 27 Upon appeal to the Second Circuit, this finding of employee discouragement was not contested. 28 Therefore, the Waterbury
court focused its attention on the Board's proof of discrimination.
The Waterbury court recognized that, although the general rule is
that the burden of proof of discriminatory intent rests with the Board,
there are some instances where no proof is required. When the conduct
of the employer is of such a nature that it carries with it "unavoidable
consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must
have intended and thus bears its own indicia of intent," the court held
that it would assume that the "real motive" of the employer was antiunion animus and that his conduct was of an inherently destructive
nature. 29 However, the court held that there was nothing inherently
destructive about the discharge of a single employee for cause, even if
that employee was a union activist. Since it was clear that the employee in question would have been fired regardless of his union status,
22. NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1970).
23. NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978).
24. NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co. & Liberty Eng. Corp., 474 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973).
25. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
26. 587 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
27. 233 N.L.R.B. 1312 (1977).
28. 587 F.2d at 96.
29. Id. at 98.
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the court held that there had been no violation. The court stated that it
is well-established that employees who are active in union affairs do
not thereby obtain a special immunity from ordinary employment deci30
sions.
However, in describing the inherently destructive tier of the Great
Dane test, the Second Circuit misinterpreted what should be the result
when an employer claimed a business justification for his conduct. The
Waterbury court stated that, where the employer asserts such justification for layoffs, some basis for concluding that they were motivated by
anti-union animus must be shown. 31 The Waterbury court seemed to
be shifting the burden of proof back to the Board once the employer
has asserted a business justification for his conduct. However, the
Supreme Court clearly stated in Great Dane that, where the employer's
conduct falls within the inherently destructive category, there is no additional proof required of the Board.3 2 Even if the employer comes
forward with a valid business justification, the Board is still free to
draw the inference of improper motive from the inherently destructive
33
conduct itself.
In PortlandWillamette Co. v. NLRB, 34 the Ninth Circuit held that
the employer's refusal to give retroactive pay raises to strikers who had
not returned to work by a specified date was not inherently destructive
of protected employee rights. In Portland,the employees had gone on
strike over the issue of retroactive pay raises. Although this issue was
never formally resolved, most of the strikers returned to work with the
permission of their union. The employer proceeded to give retroactive
pay raises to those employees who had returned to work by a specified
date. Those employees who had returned after that date were reinstated with all seniority rights, but did not receive the retroactive raises.
The Board found that limiting the retroactive raises to those on the
payroll as of a specified date was inherently destructive of the employees' right to strike.35 The Board made this finding even though it also
found that the employer neither foresaw nor intended anti-union con36
sequences.
On appellate review, the Ninth Circuit observed that the cases in
which the employer's conduct had been found to be inherently destruc30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 97.
Id.
388 U.S. at 33.
Id. at 33-34.
534 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id.at 1333-34.
Id. at 1334.
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tive involved conduct with far-reaching effects tending to hinder future
bargaining or which discriminated solely upon the basis of participation in strikes or union activity.37 The court held that in the Portland
case the effect of the conduct complained of-granting retroactive
raises to workers who had returned to work by a specific date-was
limited to a particular instance and was not comparable to the continuing consequences of such actions as granting superseniority to strikebreakers. 38 The Portlandcourt further found that, since the employer
clearly did not intend its action to serve as a cut-off date for the strike,
there was no basis upon which the Board could find that the employer's
39
action bore its own indicia of illegal intent.
This last conclusion of the Portlandcourt is a further confusion of
the standards set forth in Great Dane. The Portland court applied a
subjective standard to determine the intent of the employer.4 0 However, the Great Dane standard for finding intent is an objective one.
The inference of intent under Great Dane is drawn from the nature of
the employer's questioned conduct rather than from what he was feeling at the time the conduct occurred. In sum, the Great Dane focus is
on the conduct which bears the indicia of intent, not on the employer's
subjective intention.
In Loomis Courier Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 4' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it was not inherently
destructive of employee rights for a financially troubled employer to
move one of its offices outside the geographical boundaries of the local
union. The Loomis court overruled the Board on the grounds that the
Board's factual finding that the employer's actions were coercive was
not substantially supported by the record. In support of this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stated that the facts presented were equally susceptible to a contrary interpretation. Moreover, the court concluded
that the employer had reasonably accounted for each circumstance at
issue. There are two problems with this decision. The first is that
where the facts are equally susceptible to two reasonable views, the circuit court is bound to adhere to the Board view, even though it might
have decided the case differently in an independent proceeding. 4 3 The
second problem is that the Great Dane Court explicitly stated that the
37.

Id.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
595 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 499.
See NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Board need not accept employer justification where inherently destructive behavior has been found. Thus, the Ninth Circuit should have
upheld the Board's findings.
Similarly, in NLRB v. Moore Business Forms,44 the Fifth Circuit
found inherently destructive behavior but only in the absence of a
showing of an "overriding business purpose justifying the invasion of
union rights." And, in System Council T-4 v. NLRB, 4 5 the Seventh Circuit stated that withholding accrued benefits from strikers was inherently destructive unless the employer could prove a legitimate purpose.
Thus, the number of cases purporting to apply the first tier of the
Great Dane test is both small and generally confused. While the
Supreme Court has stated that inherently destructive behavior may be
violative of the Act despite a showing of legitimate business purpose,
the circuit courts have tended to be more lenient by allowing employers' business justifications to overcome the "indicia of intent" associated with their actions.
The Anti- Union Animus Test
The second tier of the Great Dane test involves situations where
the adverse effect of an employer's discriminatory conduct is comparatively slight. In such cases, if the employer comes forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justification for the
challenged conduct, actual anti-union animus must be proven. 46 This
part of the test has caused the sharpest split between the circuit courts
and the Board, as well as among the circuits themselves.
When the employer has asserted a legitimate business reason for
its actions, the Board's position has been that any anti-union motivation, regardless of its relative insignificance, is sufficient for a finding of
a violation of the Act.4 7 Thus, whenever legal and illegal motives exist
concurrently, the Board finds a violation. The Board recognizes that
the First and Ninth Circuits refuse to accept this view,4 8 but perceives
at least a majority of the remaining circuits to be in accord with its
49
position.
The position adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for
44.
45.
46.
47.
(1978).
48.
49.

574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978).
446 F.2d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1059 (1972).
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
See Irving, How the Board Fares in Court, 31 N.Y.U. NAT'L CONF.
See also American Beef Packers, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 875 (1972).
Id.
Id.

ON LABOR

63, 64
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the First Circuit regarding the second tier of the Great Dane test is
illustrated by its holding in NLRB v. Wells Fargo Armored Service
Corp.50 In Wells Fargo, the First Circuit stated that "the Board must
find that anti-union animus was the dominant motive for the [employer's conduct] and that it would not have taken place 'but for' such
animus." 5 1 In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 52 the First Circuit chastised the Board for repeatedly refusing to follow the dominant
motivation test established by that court. By failing to do so, the Board
caused needless litigation because the court would routinely deny enforcement of any Board order which was based upon a partial motiva53
tion test.
The Ninth Circuit takes the same position as the First Circuit. In
Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 54 the court stated that where a
discharge was motivated by multiple factors, the central issue is: "How
significant of a role must the anti-union animus play . . . in order to
constitute a violation of section 8(a)(3)?" 5 5 The court answered this
question by holding that anti-union animus must be the predominant
motive involved in the employer's actions.5 6 In so holding, the Western
Exterminator court overruled a Board order. The Board and the court
had analyzed the facts in identical fashion, but they had drawn disparate conclusions. The Board had found a violation because illegal motivation was "at least part" of the basis for the employer's conduct.
This test was not acceptable to the court, which maintained that the
illegal motivation must be the predominant one in order for a violation
57
of section 8(a)(3) to be found.
While the remaining circuits do not take as strong a position
against the Board's partial motivation analysis, it is clear that the circuit courts are not as likely as the Board to find a violation when the
employer's anti-union motivation is relatively insignificant. In NLRB
v. Computed Time Corp.,58 the Fifth Circuit discussed the two major
considerations to be followed in determining violations of the Act
where there has been no inherently discriminatory behavior. The first
was that management is the complete master of its own business affairs
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

597 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1979).
Id.at 10.
592 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1979).
Id. at 606 (Aldrich, J., concurring).
565 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1977).
Id.at 1117.
Id.at 1118.
Id. at 1119.
587 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1979).
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and has total freedom to make business decisions with one exception:
it may not act when the real motivating purpose is to do something
which the Act forbids.5 9 The second consideration was that the burden
of proof is upon the Board to present evidence that the employer's conduct was the result of improper motives. 60 By speaking of the purpose,
rather than a purpose, the court suggested that the illegal motivation
must be more than merely a contributing factor to the employer's disputed actions. Furthermore, the court did not state that a violation
would be found where improper motive exists regardless of its insignificance, but rather that the conduct in question must be the result of
improper motives. This suggests a much more stringent test than that
employed by the Board.
The Fourth Circuit, in American ManufacturingAssociates, Inc. v.
NLRB, 6 1 took exception to a Board finding that an employer's reasons
for discharging his employees were "pretextual." The court held that
"[w]hen an employer has, as did the employer in this case, a perfectly
valid reason to discharge or discipline an employee . . .the Board
[must find] an affirmative and persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose a bad one."'62 By emphasizing the
choice of one reason over the other, the court indicated that, in order to
find a violation of the Act, the good reason must have been
subordinated to the bad one.
Similarly, in EdgewoodNursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 63 the Third
Circuit stated that an employer violates the Act if anti-union animus
was the "real motive" for his actions. The burden is on the Board to
prove that the employer's asserted business justifications for his actions
were pretextual. Again, this language denotes a more stringent test
than that applied by the Board.
Even though the remaining circuits purportedly apply a "partial
motivation" analysis, 64 it is recognized that determining whether antiunion animus was at least part of the motivation behind an employer's
actions can be very difficult. 65 A burden of proof is imposed upon the
Board to demonstrate explicitly that an improper motive contributed to
59.

Id. at 795.

60. Id.
61. 594 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1979).
62. Id. at 36.
63. 581 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1978).
64. See Head Division, AMF, Inc. v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Gogin,
575 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1978); Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Broyhill
Co., 514 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Advanced Business Forms Corp., 474 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir. 1973); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1964).
65. Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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the employer's action. 66 Thus, even in circuits where partial anti-union
motivation is sufficient for finding a violation, the courts do not apply
this test mechanically. 67 The courts are much more likely than the
Board to take legitimate business interests into consideration and give
68
them added weight in making their determinations.
INDIANA

&

MICHIG4N ELECTRIC

Co. v NLRB

Facts of the Case
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB 69 involved a work stoppage engaged in by fifty members of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers in violation of a no-strike clause in the union's contract with the employer electric company. Five union stewards70 falsely
informed their supervisors that they were ill and left with the other
strikers. That afternoon three of the stewards returned to work in an
effort to end the strike, but the two other stewards did not. All of the
strikers returned to work the next morning. The company took the following disciplinary action: the rank-and-file participants received a
written warning; the three stewards who belatedly aided the effort to
end the strike each received a one-day suspension; and the two stewards who did not try to end the strike each received a three-day suspen71
sion.
The union filed charges with the Board alleging that the disciplinary action against the five union officials constituted a violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act, and the Board issued a complaint. 72 The administrative law judge held that the company's actions
discriminated against the five union officers solely upon the basis of
their position with the union and issued an order accordingly. 73 The
Board affirmed. 74 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit refused enforcement.
66. M.S.P. Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 173 (10th Cir. 1977).
67. See Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLR,4 and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee
Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 735 (1965).
68. Id. at 736.
69. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
70. Although the Seventh Circuit referred to four stewards and one union officer, the record
of the proceedings before the administrative law judge shows that all five suspended employees
were stewards. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978).
71. 599 F.2d at 229.
72. Id.
73. The order stated, in part, that the employer-electric company would cease and desist from
"[sluspending employees who engage in strikes or any other concerted activity, because they hold
positions as union stewards." Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 226, 230 (1978).
74. 599 F.2d at 228.
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The Seventh Circuit's Holding
The court's denial was based upon two lines of reasoning: first,
that the Board had not met the standard espoused by the Supreme
Court in Great Dane; and second, that the Board's decision was a departure from its own precedent and erroneous.
The Indiana court stated that the unfair labor practice in the instant case was grounded primarily upon section 8(a)(3). 75 The court
assumed that disciplining union stewards or officers more severely than
rank-and-file members for participating in an illegal strike constituted
discriminatory conduct for purposes of the Great Dane test. 76 The
court found that the Board has relied solely upon the "inherently destructive" nature of the employer's actions and accordingly determined
that "the narrow issue before us is whether the employer's conduct was
' 77
inherently destructive of important employee rights.
The Seventh Circuit held that the employer's actions were not inherently destructive of employee rights. The court reasoned that the
more severe punishment was not based solely upon the union officials'
status but upon their breach of the higher responsibility that accompanies that status. The court further stated that until recently the Board
had been in agreement with the proposition that the higher responsibilities of union officials justified disciplining them more severely for participating in unprotected activity. 7 8 The Indiana court held that recent
Board decisions to the contrary represented a departure from that view
and were erroneous. 79 The court further held that the employer action
in the instant case at most deterred union officials from deliberately
engaging in clearly unlawful conduct and, therefore, the employer's ac80
tion was not violative of the Act.
ANALYSIS

In Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.,81 the Board issued a summary
judgment based upon its view that its decision in Precision Casting
75. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), provides in pertinent part that:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . ..
76. 599 F.2d at 229. Under Great Dane, a resulting discouragement of union membership
also must be shown. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
77. 599 F.2d at 229-30.
78. Id. at 229.
79. Id. at 231.
80. Id. at 230.
81. 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978).
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Co.82 was controlling. In Precision,five shop stewards were suspended
for three days as a result of their participation in an unlawful strike.
None of the rank-and-file members were disciplined in any way. The
Board held that the employer's freedom to discipline remained unfettered so long as the criteria involved were not union-related. The employer admitted that the basis for selecting these particular employees
for discipline was their position as shop stewards but contended that,
under the terms of the contract, they could be held to a greater degree
of accountability for participating in the strike. The Board held that
discrimination directed against an employee on the basis of his or her
holding union office was contrary to the plain meaning of section
8(a)(3) and would frustrate the policy of the Act if allowed to stand.
Thus, in Precision Casting, the Board had articulated a rule that prevents employers from disciplining union officials more harshly than
rank-and-file members, even for unlawful strike activity, when that discipline is based upon the employee's union status.
It has been well-established by both the Board and the courts that
an employer may lawfully discharge an employee for engaging in a
strike which is forbidden by the provisions of a no-strike agreement
because such activity is not protected by the Act. 83 The issue here is
whether the extent of such discipline may be based upon union status.
The Indiana court held that the employer's action in the instant
case was not inherently destructive of important employee rights. The
court did recognize, however, that employer action that would discourage union members from holding union office would have an inherently adverse effect upon employee rights.84 An argument can be made
that such discouragement might be the result of the employer action in
the instant case. If union stewards are to be more harshly disciplined
for mere participation in, as opposed to leadership of, illegal strike activity, discouragement may well result. And, if such discouragement
was the result of the employer's actions, definite and continuing obstacles to the employees' rights of self-organization and collective bargaining would arise. Those rights would be difficult to assert when union
members are reluctant to assume leadership roles.
However, given the precedent in the area, the better view is that
82. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
83. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, reh. denied,416 U.S. 952 (1974); NLRB v. Rockaway'News Supply Co., Inc., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939);
Chesty Foods Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 388 (1974); Stop & Shop, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 75 (1966); Alton Box
Board Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1965); Russell Packing Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 194 (1961).
84. 599 F.2d at 230.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

the employer's action in the instant case was not inherently destructive.
Employer actions which have been found to be inherently destructive
are those which prevent union formation or penalize employees solely
because they are union members. 85 As the Indiana court reasoned, the
effect of this employer's conduct would be to deter further illegal activity by those charged with upholding the no-strike agreement. The Seventh Circuit stated that the discipline in the instant case was not based
upon union status, but rather upon the responsibility that is attached to
the position of union steward. Such action is not equivalent to those
actions which would prevent union formation or penalize employees
solely because of union status.
The Indiana court did not consider the second tier of the Great
Dane test because the Board did not contend that the employer was
motivated by anti-union animus. 86 The legitimacy and substantiality
of the employer's actions-assuring uninterrupted electrical service to
the community-was uncontested. 87 Thus, there was no basis, under
either the first or second tier of the Great Dane test, upon which to find
a violation of the Act.
While the first part of the Indiana decision rests upon strong
ground, the second part of the decision is based upon much weaker
ground. The second part of the decision deals with Board precedent
and is misleading and superfluous to the decision rendered.
Basic to the Board's recent decisions concerning discriminatory
discipline is its overriding policy to insulate employees' employment
status from their union activities.8 8 That is, in cases where the Board
has found that discipline was based upon an individual's union office
rather than upon his conduct as an employee, the Board has found that
the employer committed an unfair labor practice violative of the Act. 89
The Board's position has been that the employer is free to choose
whom he will hire and fire, so long as the basis for that selection is not
discriminatory. 90 The Indiana court interpreted the Board's decisions
prior to Precision Casting Co.9 1 as supporting the position that disci85. See notes 17-25 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
87. 599 F.2d at 230 n.4.
88. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976). The
court stated: "The Act's provisions were designed to permit workers to exercise freely the right to
join unions, to be active or passive members, or to abstain from joining any union at all without
imperiling their right to a livelihood." Id. at 1163.
89. See, e.g., Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 237
N.L.R.B. 226 (1978); Precision Casting Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1978).
90. American Beef Packers, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 875 (1972).
91. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977). See notes 92-106 infra and accompanying text.
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pline could be based upon union office when unlawful strike activity
was involved. The court therefore held that the Precision Castingdecision, upon which the Board based its Indiana decision, was erroneous
and reversible. However, such an interpretation does not hold up
under a careful examination of the cases.
In determining that the Board's order in Indiana was a departure
from its own precedent, the Seventh Circuit began with the Boardarticulated proposition that an employer having a reasonable basis for
making such a distinction may discipline fewer than all unlawful strikers. 9 2 The court went on to state that the higher responsibility of union
officials had been considered to be such justification in cases prior to
Precision Casting Co.93 However, it should be noted that, in all but one
of the cases cited by the court of appeals as being contrary to the
Board's ruling in the instant case, factors of leadership and contractual
obligations played an important role not present in the instant case.
The Indiana court relied heavily upon the Board's decision in
Chrysler Corp. v. Dodge Truck Plant94 to buttress its holding that the
decision in Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. represented a departure
from prior law.9 5 In Chrysler, the Board upheld the discharge of a
chief steward for unlawful strike activity. In the instant case, counsel
for the Board attempted to distinguish Chrysler on the basis that the
chief steward of the Dodge plant had played a leadership role in that
walkout, while the electric company stewards had played no active
leadership role. The Indiana court dismissed that argument, citing the
administrative law judge's finding, affirmed by the Board, that the
Dodge steward's leadership role had been established not by any assertive actions in leading the strike but rather by his "presence during
illegal strike activities. '96 But a reading of the Board decision reveals
that the discharged Dodge employee had arranged an alternate location for the strike meeting when the original site became unavailable,
encouraged rank-and-fie to attend the meeting, participated in that
92. The court cited J.P. Wetherby Construction Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 690, 697 n.31 (1970), as
the source for this proposition. It should be noted that in that case the disciplined steward had led
the unlawful activity. This is a factor which will be seen in most of the labor cases cited by the
Indiana court. Both the court and the Board cited NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U.S. 240, 259 (1939), in support of this point. However, in that case, discrimination based upon
union status was not at issue. There, all striking employees were offered reinstatement if they
reapplied within a certain time period. All those who reapplied were rehired with the exception of
two employees, neither of whom were union officers. The Supreme Court merely upheld an employer's normal right to select its employees.
93. 599 F.2d at 230.
94. 232 N.L.R.B. 466 (1977).
95. 599 F.2d at 230.
96. 232 N.L.R.B. at 475.
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meeting, and played an active leadership role. 97 In fact, the Board
stated: "It is clear that if the factional activity was not completely
under his [the chief steward's] control at the beginning, it was certainly
his show by the end of the evening." 98 The steward also was given a
warning prior to the walkout concerning the consequences should he
participate. In its findings, the Board stated that the severity of this
discipline in comparison to that received by other members was easily
explained by his active leadership role.
Thus, it appears that the Indiana court's dismissal of this distinction was not justified. For while it is clear that, when a union leader
instigates or incites a work stoppage, he will be subject to greater discipline than will mere participants, it is also clear that any non-officer
instigators also will be subject to greater discipline. 99 It does not necessarily follow that a steward or union officer who played no active leadership role in a work stoppage should be subject to greater discipline.
By dismissing this leadership distinction, the Seventh Circuit denied
the clear thrust of the Board's holding in Chrysler Corp. v. Dodge Truck
Plant0 0 that the difference in discipline was based upon the steward's
leadership activity during the unlawful strike, not his union status.
In closing its discussion of the Chrysler case, the Indiana court referred to the related case of Super Value Xenia'0 to further support its
opinion. In that case, the chief steward was discharged, while all other
strikers were reinstated after participating in an unlawful work stoppage. In upholding that discharge, the Board did not even address
whether there was an unfair labor practice involved. Rather, the Board
found that the steward was discharged as a consequence of participating in an unauthorized work stoppage contrary to the provision of that
union's collective bargaining agreement. In that agreement, there was
a specific clause which provided that "the employer had authority to
impose proper discipline, including discharge, in the event the steward
has taken unauthorized strike action .... ,,"02 Where the union leader
has greater responsibility to the employer by contract provision, the
issue of whether he is subject to greater discipline is foreclosed by those
97.

Id.

98. Id.
99. Michigan Lumber Fabricators, Inc., III N.L.R.B. 579 (1955); See Note, Considerationsin
DiscipliningEmployees/or Participationin Violations ofthe No-Strike Clause, 106 U. PA. L. REV.
999, 1017 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Considerationsin DiscipliningEmployees].
100. 232 N.L.R.B. 466 (1977).
101. 228 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1977).
102. Id.
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provisions. 10 3 However, this is distinguishable from the facts of the instant case because the contract between the union and the employer
had no provisions addressing the responsibilities or discipline of union
stewards. 104
The Board decision cited by the Indianacourt which most directly
supports its position is Russell Packing Co. 105 In that case, an assistant
steward instigated a work stoppage by leaving his place at a conveyor
belt in order to submit a grievance. Such grievances were supposed to
be submitted in writing so that work would not be disrupted. The chief
steward, whose discharge was in question, also left the belt to aide his
assistant. There followed a brief walkout by the remaining employees
working on the conveyor belt. After a short time, the chief steward
returned to the work room and attempted to persuade the other workers to return to the conveyor belt. Both the assistant and chief stewards
were discharged as a result of their actions. The discharge of the assistant steward was not questioned by the union because he had been the
leader of the walkout. The Board upheld the discharge of the chief
steward because he was the union's spokesman in the affected area and
was aware that the agreement was being violated. 1°6 By joining the
assistant steward in seeking an immediate settlement of the grievance,
he had participated and acquiesced in unprotected conduct. Thus, the
Russell decision supported the Seventh Circuit's holding in Indiana
that a steward may be discriminatorily disciplined for mere participation in, as opposed to leadership of, the unauthorized action. 0 7
Three more Board decisions were cited by the Indiana court in
support of its decision to deny enforcement of the Board's order in the
instant case. In University OverlandExpress, Inc.,10 8 the Board upheld
the discharge of a steward whom the employer had reasonable cause to
believe was responsible for a work stoppage. Again, in Stockham Pipe
Fillings Co., 109 the Board recognized the leadership role of the steward,
as well as the contract provisions relating thereto, as valid reasons for
imposing greater discipline upon the steward. While the Indiana court
recognized the Board's consideration of those employees' leadership
103. Id See W. CONNOLLY & M. CONNOLLY, WORK STOPPAGES AND UNION RESPONSIBILITY
239 (1977).
104. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., [1978] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 19,492.
105. 133 N.L.R.B. 194 (1961).
106. Id.
107. Id. The administrative law judge hearing the instant case distinguished Russell Packing
Co. on the basis that the chief steward was found by his conduct to have precipitated a walkout.
Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 226, 228 (1978).
108. 129 N.L.R.B. 82 (1960).
109. 84 N.L.R.B. 629 (1949).
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roles in reaching its decisions, it chose to dismiss that factor as a distinguishable consideration in reaching its own decision." l0
Finally, the Indiana court referred to Riviera ManufacturingCo."'
as a related case which supported its position. However, in that case,
the discharged steward had a history of insubordination and was ultimately fired for failing to follow management orders. His discharge
was totally unrelated to his position as steward. Thus, it can be seen
that, of all the Board decisions cited by the Indianacourt, only Russell
supported the court's position that the Board's decision in the instant
case was a clear departure from prior law.
If the Board's decision in Precision Casting Co. 112 represented a
departure from Board precedent, it was in the area of disciplining
union officials based upon their contractual obligation."13 As previously discussed, where a union-management contract stated specifically
that union officials were responsible for averting unauthorized activity,
those officials could be disciplined for their failure to do so. In Precision, it was held that despite contract provisions stating that the union
shall use every reasonable effort to terminate the unauthorized action,
the employer could not hold union officials more responsible than
rank-and-file. Although the Indiana court stated that union officials
generally had a higher responsibility that accompanied their status, it
did not base this assumption upon contractual considerations. The
court did not address the contractual issue which would have been a
much stronger argument in support of its position that the Board's decision was a departure from precedent and erroneous. 114
Even if the Board decision in Indiana was a departure from its
own precedent, the United States Supreme Court has held that earlier
precedents do not prevent the Board from adopting a different ruling in
a subsequent case.' '5 The Court has stated that "to hold that the
110. 599 F.2d at 230-31.
1!1. 167 N.L.R.B. 772 (1967).
112. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
113. The Indiana court also referred to the Board's decision in Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881
(1978), along with the Precision Casting decision, as representing a departure from precedent. In
Gould, the Board also held that harsher discipline of union stewards for participating in illegal
strike activity was an unfair labor practice. The Third Circuit recently overruled that decision in
Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979). The Gouldcourt based its decision upon the
fact that the stewards were contractually obligated to enforce the no-strike clause provision of
their agreement. The Gould court relied upon the Indiana decision to support its holding.
114. Although there apparently was no such provision in the Indianacontract, this is the area
in which the Precisionand Gouldholdings represent a glaring departure from prior law. See note
106 supra and accompanying text.
115. NLRB v. Weingarten Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). In that case, the Board had held that the
denial of an employee's request to have his union representative present during talks with the
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Board's earlier decisions froze the development of a national labor law
'
would misconceive the nature of administrative decision making. "116
The Court further stated that "cumulative experience begets understanding and insight by which judgments are validated or qualified or
invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and
fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judicial process." 117
The circuit courts have held that the Board is not bound by a rule
if it subsequently determines that the reason for the rule failed and it
does not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or in violation of the Act. 1 8 The
Indianacourt did not discuss whether the Board's decision fell into any
of those categories. Rather, it labeled the decision a departure from
precedent and seemingly equated that with error. 1 9 However, that is
not necessarily the case. Often where the Board fails to provide a rationale for its adoption of a position, or for its decision in a case, the
proper course for a reviewing court is to remand the matter to the
Board for explanation of its reason. 120 However, a remand would be
improper where the reviewing court determined that the rule or decision did not further the Act's policy. 12' In the instant case, while it is
clear that the court did not like the Board's decision, the court did not
make clear how the decision would negatively affect the furtherance of
the Act's policy. In fact, the court did not fully discuss the policy considerations involved in the discriminatory discipline of union officials.
The court, however, did briefly touch upon the areas of superseniority
and employer remedies. These policy considerations merit examination.

employer was an unfair labor practice. The circuit court rejected this holding because of a long
line of Board decisions to the contrary. NLRB v. Weingarten Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court reversed.
116. 420 U.S. at 265-66. While the Court upheld the Board's departure, the dissenting opinion
by Chief Justice Burger stated that the case should be remanded by the court of appeals to the
Board for an explanation of its change in policy. In either case, the Court did not view the departure as reversible error. Id. at 269.
117. Id. at 266.
118. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1964).
119. 599 F.2d at 231.
120. See Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1978).
121. Id.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING
DISCRIMINATORY DISCIPLINE OF UNION OFFICIALS

In a footnote in its opinion, 22 the Indiana court cited several cases
where the Board recognized that the special responsibilities of union
officials justified the employer in treating them more favorably than the
rank-and-file when doing so facilitated the discharge of those responsibilities. The court reasoned that, if union officers receive special consideration for performing their duties, they should also receive special
discipline for not performing them.
Over forty percent of all labor contracts contain special provisions
granting stewards preference in seniority rights.123 This special preference manifests itself in the form of "superseniority."' 24 It has been
stated that the true rationale for allowing superseniority provisions is
found in the important function served by the union official. 25 Superseniority provides continuity of representation in carrying out the
objectives of a collective bargaining agreement. 26 The issue raised
here is whether the harsher disciplining of union stewards, absent any
leadership role or special contractual provisions, is consistent with this
goal.
Strictly speaking, a shop steward is not an officer of the local.
However, he is the union representative who comes inclosest contact
with the members. 127 His major functions are to handle grievances
which members have against their employer 28 and to advise the rankand-file concerning the terms of their employment contract. 29 For
these reasons, the steward experiences the full impact of potential conflict and tension in the work area.' 30 Thus, the position can be a burdensome one if taken seriously since any problem within the
department becomes a problem for the steward.' 3' Aside from super122. 599 F.2d at 231 n.10.
123. BNA, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 77 (9th ed. 1979).
.124. See Note, Union StewardSuperseniority, 6 N.Y.U. L. & Soc. CH. 1 (1976-77). Superseniority may be granted to union stewards for purposes of lay-offs and recalls. This enables the
steward to remain at work and available for contract administration and grievance processing. If
the steward were laid off like an ordinary employee, the remaining bargaining unit employees
would be left without a representative.
125. D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1978).
126. Id.
127. F. PETERSON, AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS (1963) [hereinafter referred to as PETERSON].
128. J. SEIDMAN, J. LONDON, D. KARSH & D. TAGLIocozzo, THE WORKER VIEws His
UNION 166 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as SEIDMAN].
129.

J. BARBASH, AMERICAN UNIONS' STRUCTURE, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 48-52 (1967)

[hereinafter referred to as BARBASH].
130. Id.
131. SEIDMAN supra note 128.
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seniority, 32 stewards may receive other benefits in the form of dues
33
remission or nominal fees. 1
From a labor viewpoint, if the employer is able to discipline a
steward more harshly than the rank-and-file for mere participation in
unauthorized strike activity, a burdensome position becomes even
more unappealing; and the goal of continuous representation in the
grievance process becomes more difficult. The argument also has been
advanced by the Board that a steward's extra duties are owed to the
union, not to the employer.134 Therefore, when a steward is derelict in
his duty to forestall an illegal strike, the union is the aggrieved party,
not to the employer. 135 Discipline of the steward should be a function
of the union rather than the employer.
From a management viewpoint, the primary benefit derived from
a collective bargaining agreement is the promise of labor peace for the
term of that agreement. 136 To further effectuate the agreement, the employer may grant seniority preference to stewards to facilitate maintenance of labor peace. 137 When the no-strike clause of the agreement is
violated, the employer loses the essential fruits of his bargain; he is
denied the only consideration which he obtained from the union in exchange for his numerous commitments. 138 It can also be stated that,
when a steward participates in unlawful activity, the employer loses the
added assurance which he bargained for by granting steward seniority
preference. In essence, the employer has granted benefits for which he
has received no return. Without the ability to impose stricter discipline
on union stewards, the employer is left without the assurance of tranquility for which he bargained and has no weapons to use as a deterrent against further illegal action.139 This is particularly true since the
union steward is the person in the work area charged with maintaining
140
the terms of the no-strike agreement.
132. This right has generally been limited to layoff and recall. Special on-the-job preferences
cannot be granted to stewards because this would encourage union membership which is an unfair
labor practice. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir.
1976).
133.

134.
ployees
135.
136.

BARBASH supra note 129.

See Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978). See also Considerations in Disciplining Emsupra note 99.
Id.
Bartlett, Strikes in Violation of the Contract: .4 Management View, 31 N.Y.U. NAT'L

CONF. ON LABOR 117 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Bartlett].

137. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
138. Bartlett, supra note 136, at 118.
139. The Indianacourt stated that the purpose of the employer's action was to deter stewards
from further illegal acts. 599 F.2d at 230.
140.

BARBASH supra note 129.
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The Indiana court also stated that, absent the ability to more
harshly discipline union officers for unauthorized activity, the employer
is left without a remedy. 41 However, it has been suggested by the
Board 42 and stated by several courts that the union entity itself may be
liable for damages to the employer for violation of a no-strike clause by
its members. 143 Whether such potential liability existed in the instant
case would depend upon a variety of factors. 44 While this issue was
never raised at any of the hearings, the possibility of union liability
does suggest that there may be a remedy available to the employer
other than harsher discipline of individual union officers.
CONCLUSION

The application of the two-tiered Great Dane test has been somewhat inconsistent and has created a sharp conflict between the circuit
courts and the Board. Both of these factors were present in the Indiana
decision. While the court expressed an obvious dislike for the Board's
decision, it failed to definitively state what type of behavior would constitute inherently destructive conduct by an employer. The court's decision gave the impression that the behavior involved was not
inherently destructive because the court said that it was not. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had an opportunity in the instant case to pull together some of the threads that run
through the "inherently destructive" body of case law but instead chose
to dismiss briefly the Board's decision. This was unfortunate given the
confusion surrounding this area of the law.
The Indiana court also made much of the fact that the Board's
decision was a departure from its own case law and erroneous. However, there is no rule which prevents the Board from departing from its
previous decisions. Furthermore, the court misconstrued some of the
141. 599 F.2d at 230 n.4. The court noted that the absence of any damage remedy against the
strikers for breach of the no-strike clause made the possibility of disciplinary action the only
effective deterrent to violation of that clause.
142. Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978). See [1978] LAB. L. REP. 19,555.
143. United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975). This
case gives a good overview of the applicable law. See also Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. UMWA,
436 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,402 U.S. 920 (1971); United Constr. Workers v. Haislip
Bakery Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,356 U.S. 847 (1956). Generally, for liability
to be imposed upon the union, it must be shown that the union was a party to the strike.
144. Some of these factors are whether the union sanctioned, approved, or incited the strike,
Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974); whether union
agents engaged in the unlawful strike were acting within the scope of their authority, United
Constr. Workers v. Haislip Bakery Co., 233 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847
(1956); and the history of unlawful strikes by that union, U.S. Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975).
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earlier Board decisions in buttressing its conclusions that the Board was
in error.
The Indiana court should have based its decision solely upon the
Great Dane line of cases and dispensed with the relatively lengthy discussion of Board decisions. Given the legal precedent in this area, the
Indiana decision was probably the correct one. Employer actions
which have been found to be violations under the inherently destructive standard generally have been those which work to prevent union
formation or to penalize employees for union activity. As the Indiana
court stated, the employer's actions in the instant case served to deter
further illegal acts by union stewards. However, the court diluted the
strength of its decision by its ill-considered discussion of Board precedent. The Indiana decision is based more upon contempt for the
Board's decision in the instant case than upon careful legal reasoning.
RANDY SHINER
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